ACTA HISTORICA - A MTA TÖRTÉNETTUDOMÁNYI FOLYÓIRATA TOM. 21 (1975)

21. kötet / 1-2. sz. - ETUDES - I. GONDA: The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Unrestricted Submarine Warfare

I. Gonda against the U.S. was growing stronger in America. The American government, ac­cording to Tarnowsky, would have willingly maintained the relations with Austria-Hungary in spite of all this, but by then it also feared that the rupture was hardly avoidable.112 The entrance of the United States into the World War preoccupied first of all the diplomats of Germany and Austria-Hungary in Washington since they could gauge the consequences of this step on the ground of directly acquired informations and impressions, and they were the first to be able to get some idea of the causes of the entrance even if these were not quite distinct. Thus, for instance, German Am­bassador Bernstorff, who was really one of the main opponents of the unrestricted submarine warfare, was aware of the fact that the war to be waged against America entailed economic consequences that were difficult to foresee, and he also knew that a better peace might have been achieved with the help of America than against America as she would have supported the German stand in the question of the free­dom of the seas among others. Bernstorff argued that Germany could have obtained an acceptable peace even under the given circumstances if she had supported the diplomatic peace with measures and political reforms, too, at home, especially with the introduction of the parliamentary system. If this had already happened some months before April, perhaps Wilson would not have broken off the diplomatic rela­tions with Germany.113 It seems doubtless that Bernstorff slightly exaggerated the significance of the democratization of Germany from the point of view of the German relations with the United States since, all things considered, the antagonism between the imperialist powers cannot be attributed to the antagonism between the parliamentary and au­tocratic systems even if it has an important share in the former antagonism. In fact Ambassador Bernstorff gauged the situation realistically when he wrote of the con­sequences of the American intervention. Although the British-German antagonism was sharpened by the differences of the political systems of the two countries, it was not determined by them. The non-existence of democratism in the countries of the Central Powers suggested - first of all to the adherents of the Wilsonian bourgeois democracy — that it was the essential meaning of the American attitude. It is re­markable that such elements manifested themselves in the mentality of Ambassador Bernstorff; that is why his reports and proposals could less and less serve as the basis of decision making for the rightist German political tendencies. The first reports of Tarnowsky also reflected similar illusions, however in the last period of his mission he was forced to appraise the political implications more realistically, though his reports on America's relations with Austria-Hungary were characterized by extreme optimism all the time. It is therefore a remarkable fact that 1,2 ibid., Tel. von Gr. Hadik, Stockholm, 4 April 1917, no. 118, Tel. von Gr. Tarnowsky, vom 7. d.M. 113 ibid.. The report on the talks with Bernstorff, received on 6 April, was handed over by a very trustworthy personality; its content can be regarded as authentic. Signed: Mittnacht, fol. 25-6. Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungartcae 21, 1975

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