Kiraly, Bela K. - Stokes, Gale (szerk.): Insurrections, Wars, and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s - East Europen monographs 197. Brooklyn College Studies on Society in Change 36. Atlantic studies (New York, 1985)
III. Insurrection and Wars in the Balkans - Richard L. DiNardo: Russian Military Operations in 1877 - 78
■ RICHARD L. Dl NARDO 126 Russian naval power in the Black Sea, the Russians had not yet created serious naval forces there. This vitiated the logical strategy, a seaborne leapfrog down the coast to Varna, followed by a march on Edirne using the Black Sea ports as bases. Given these circumstances, the Russian commander, Tsar Alexander’s brother the Grand Duke Nikolay, deployed his 200,000 men (three corps plus auxiliary troops and Cossacks) as follows: the right wing, consisting of the Eighth and Twelfth Cavalry Divisions, plus three Cossack regiments, would cross the frontier at Ungheni and advance on the Ia؛؟i-Ploies؛i—Bucharest axis, with the Eighth Division going for the key town of Nikopol. The center, under Nikolay himself, with the Twelfth Corps, the Fifth Infantry Division of the Ninth Corps, and a Cossack regiment, would move parallel to the right wing to Bucharest. To carry out the most important part of the plan, the left wing was given a large force divided into three parts. The advance guard, composed of Cossacks, a rifle brigade, and some mountain artillery under Mikhail Dmitryevich Skobelev, had to take the railway bridge over the Seret at Gala؛؛ to secure the Romanian rail system. The Eleventh Cavalry Division would move on Ruse. Finally, the Eighth Corps would move on Bucharest. These operations would be screened by the Eleventh Corps. Having advanced across the Wallachian plain, the army would then cross the Danube and fight its way over the Balkans to Edirne, opening the way to Constantinople. Since the army would have to pass through Romanian territory, permission was secured from Prince Carol of Romania to allow transit for the Russians.3 If there is one criticism that can be leveled at the Russians, it is of their paucity of numbers. Given the extended line of communication that had to be maintained, along with detachments and casualties, it was highly unlikely that the army could make it to Constantinople without reinforcement and replacements.4 The initial advance went without a hitch, beginning the day war was declared (see Map I). By May 24 the army was concentrated as follows: Nikolay was at Bucharest with the Eighth, Twelfth, and half of the Eleventh Corps, the other half being at Oltenita. The Ninth Corps was at Slatina, and the Russians had a fine of pickets from Nikopol to Silistra. Nikolay wanted to cross the Danube at Nikopol on June 6, but the wet spring (the Danube was 15 ft. above normal) and the railway bottleneck at Ia؟i due to the difference between Russian and Romanian gauges severely hurt the Russian supply situation, forcing him to delay the crossing until the end of June.5 After being reinforced by another 72,000 troops in the Fourteenth, Fourth, and Thirteenth Corps, Nikolay planned his crossing, hoping to start after the small Russian navy had cleared the Danube of any Turkish presence. He wanted to cross at Ruse, but the delays, combined with the concentration at Bucharest, had tipped off the Turks, who fortified the