The Guardian of Liberty - Nemzetőr, 1982 (5. évfolyam, 4-6. szám)

1982-09-01 / 5. szám

12 DEPORTATIONS THAT NEVER WERE The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers have jointly sent a message to the “working people“ of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) congratulat­ing them on the 60th anniversary of the formation of the republic and the 200th anniversary uf Chechen-In­­gushetia's “voluntary incorporation into Russia". The message said that the ASSR‘s working people had “played, an active part in the struggle for the establish­ment and consolidation of Soviet rule, toiled selflessly in the years of the First Five-Year Plans, displayed cour­age and heroism on the fronts in the Great Fatherland War (the official Soviet name for the part of the Second World War from June, 1941, to the end in 1945) and made an appreicable contribution to the bulding of a de­veloped socialist society in our country“. However, the message made no mention of the deportation at gun­point in 1944 of about 500,000 Muslim Chechens and Ingushi from their long­­established homes in the Caucasus. The removal of these peoples and five other entire nations to remote areas of the USSR was a military-style exercise conducted with, great brutality. Thousands of men, women and children were shot dead or otherwise perished. The whole operation was. directed by the chief of Stalin's secret police, L. P. Baria. One of his two second-in­­command was Ivan Serov, who even­tually himself became head of the KGB ; he supervised Soviet police activity during and immediately after the 1956 Hungarian uprising. The Kremlin message's reference to Chechen-Ingushetia's "voluntary incor­poration into Russia“ is a euphemism for one of the >nany Tsarist acts of colonialism endorsed by the Soviet leadership. Aid to the Church in the Need In AUSTRALIA: ACN, Box 11 PO, EASTWOOD N.S.W. 2122 In GREAT BRITAIN: ACN, UK, 3-5 North Street, CHICHESTER West Sussex PO 19 1 LB In IRELAND: ACN, The Norbertine Fathers, Kil­­nacrott, BALLYJAMES­­DUFF, Co. Cavan and: ACN, Northern Ire­land Sub-Centre, PO Box No 76, BELFAST BT13 2DX In the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ACN, PO Box 1000, EL TORO, CA 92630 Founder and Spiritual Director of ,Church in Need’, Father van Straaren, visiting the Pope with the new President, Msgr. Lamaitre (in black soutane) THE GUARDIAN OF LIBERTY (NEMZETŐR) ArticU 16. UnivanoJ Dactorodon of Human Kghti Edited by the Editorial Board Verleger, Herausgeber und Eigentümer TIBOR KECSKESI TOLLAS Journalist, Schriftsteller, München Ferchenbachstraße 88, D-8000 München 50 GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC Verantwortlicher Redakteur (Editor): MIKLÓS VARY Ferchenbachstraße 88, D-8000 München 50 Druck (print): DANUBIA DRUCKEREI GMBH Ferchenbachstraße 88, D-8000 München 50 AFRICA REPRESENTATIVES & SALE CAMEROON: L. T. JOHNSON, Divisional Inspectorate of Education, NKAMBE, North West Province, United Rép. of CAMEROON. EAST AFRICA: (2.— Sh, by air) (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania): General-Representa*ive: International African Literary Agents. P.O. Box 46055 NAIROBI, Kenya; NIGERIA (2.— Sh): Yemi OYENEYE, P. M. B. 101, Agege, Lagos. SIERA LEONE: (10 Le. c.; annual: 60) 1. Alusine B. Kargbo, c/o 2 Alusine St., Newsite Kissy, Freetown; SOMALIA: (2.— Sh., by air) MAURITIUS NALANDA Co. Ltd., 30, Bourbon Str., Port-Louis. GREAT BRITAIN ‘NEMZETŐR", B. C. M., London S.W. 7. U. S. A. Béla H. BÁCSKAI, P.O. Box 102, Audubon/Pa. 19407. AUSTRALIA István SERFÖZÖ, 67 Winston Drv. Doncaster, Vic. 3108. PRICES: Surface mail: 1 copy AFRICA 1.80 Sh (100 CFA), Britain 60 P, Australia, USA, Canada: $ 2.— Germany: DM 4.— Annual subscription: AFRICA Sh 10 (500 CFA), Britain 3.—£, Germany/Europe : DM 20.- (or equivalent) Australia USA, Canada: $ 10.— For air mail add 25 •/• For students 50 °/o discount Our BANK ACCOUNT: No. 2605756 Commerzbank AG. Munich, German Federal Republic. SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1982 NICARAGUA DRIFTS TOWARDS DICTATORSHIP (Continued from page 10) troops had laid waste Indian villages after raping and killing the inhabitants. He added that troops had burnt and buried alive some of t'heir victims. The atrocities have focused world attention once again on Sandinista policies and the forces behind them. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE The increasingly totalitarian direction of the revolution can be directly ascribed to the growth of Cuban and Soviet influence on the Sandinista leadership. In recognition of Nicaragua’s newly assumed significance in Central America, Havana has despatched Julian López Diaz, a long-serving officer of the Cuban intelligence service, the DGI, as Ambassador to Nicaragua:. In 1966, as Cuba’s cultural attaché in Mexico City, López Diaz was expelled by the Mexican Government for supplying money and arms to a Guatemalan leftist guerrilla leader. In the mid-1970s in Costa Rica he ran a covert DGI operation smuggling Cuban and other Soviet­bloc arms to the Samdinistas who were then fight­ing to overthrow Somoza. Today, López Diaz has assumed an increasingly influential role in Niaragua’s political life. From within the Cuban embassy — the largest diploma­tic compound in Managua — be makes most of the important policy decisions for the Sandinista leadership. About 1,800 Cuban „advisers“ have taken over key posts in the Ministries concerned with the armed forces and the security services. They have made a direct contribution to a military build-up which has begun to alarm Nicaragua’s neighbours. The build-up is out of all proportion to the country’s defence needs: there are now an estimated 70,000 armed forces, including paramilitary police and reservists. By contrast, Somoza’s hated National Guard was only 7,000 strong. Meanwhile, the Sandinista« are developing close ties with the USSR and other Soviet-bloc countries. The most significant exchange was in May when Daniel Ortega visited Moscow. He was warmly welcomed by President Brezhnev and Boris Pono-marev, head of the Soviet Communist Party’s International Department. The Russians pleged support for Nicaragua’s ailing economy; but it is a telling reflection of Moscow’s own economic woes that little aid has so far been forthcoming. (The Sandinistas point­edly refused an offer of US economic aid in The Russians have, however, supplied the Nicaraguan army with Soviet-made arms and T-55 tanks (some of these have been supplied indirectly with Algeria1 acting as middleman). In addition, Nicaraguan pilots have been sent to the Soviet Union, Cuba and Bulgaria for training. The outlook is gloomy. The increasing tension in Central America poses at threat to the stability of the region. But for the Russians and Cubans to exploit this on the backs of the longsuffering Nicaraguan people is a typically cynical example of foreign-policy opportunism.

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