Magyar Filozófiai Szemle, 2011
2011 / 4. szám - SZEMLE - Summaries
SUMMARIES Perceptual Error and Perceptual Qualities Zoltán Jakab The present paper examines the tenability of the primary-secondary quality distinction in light of some current theories of perception and relevant empirical data. It is argued that the distinction can be maintained, and we offer a more precise characterization of what the difference consists in. First we examine what revelation traditionally means in color perception, and then offer an alternative concept of revelation that we claim applies to visual perception of shape, but not to that of color. Then we suggest some differences in mental representation and perceptual processing that underlie the latter sort of revelation (which we call conceptual revelation). Comparing shape and color perception we argue that for conceptual revelation to obtain in a given perceptual modality, perceptual representations of particular stimuli need to be structured and veridical. Our visual perception of shape satisfies this criterion, whereas color perception does not. To spell out more exactly the veridicality criterion, we examine the different types of perceptual error, and argue that only one of the examined types affects conceptual revelation. Privacy vs. Materialist Substance Monism Márton Miklós - Tőzsér János We have several basic intuitions about our conscious experiences. One of them is the privacy thesis according to which a certain conscious experience cannot belong to more then one subject. That is, it is impossible that two or more subjects have the same conscious experience. In our paper we argue for the claim that this privacy thesis is inconsistent with any form of substance monism, including reductive and non-reductive physicalism, and property dualism. We present several thought experiments in which the following is the case: (1) Two persons have conscious experiences at the same time. (2) The physical entities responsible for the conscious experience are the same in the case of the two persons. Then we go through the most well-known substance monist theories (such as identity theory, local or global supervenience theory, property dualism), and show that none of them provides a basis for holding that the experiences of the two persons are numerically different. Our conclusion is that we must give up either materialist substance monism or the privacy thesis. Empirical Knowledge and Physicalism Jenő Pontőr Physicalism maintains that everything is, in some sense, physical. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that physicalism is a contingent truth, if it is true at all. Hence physicalism certainly needs empirical support. The problem I shall discuss in this paper is the following: how can a universal metaphysical thesis concerning all types of entities be 195