Magyar Filozófiai Szemle, 2017
2017 / 3. szám - SZEMLE - Summaries
Summaries Is it Permissible to Believe in Moral Responsibility? László BkrnAtii - Tamás Paár In this paper we counter arguments which claim to establish that, in light of insufficient evidence, we should suspend belief in moral responsibility. We propose two arguments, the first of which shows that even if we lack sufficient evidence for moral responsibility it is not the case that we should suspend belief in it. We are under the obligation to suspend our belief about moral responsibility only if we are actually morally responsible - as we cannot have any significant obligations in case we are not morally responsible. We substantiate this argument by scrutinizing the various ways a skeptic could demand us to suspend our judgment. Our second argument shows that taking into account all our possibilities, our best option seems to be to continue believing in moral responsibility. Otherwise we would risk too much, including failing to believe in important truths and disregarding significant moral obligations. Doxastic Deontology without Voluntary Control Gabor Forrai The paper challenges William Alston’s argument against doxastic deontology, the view that we have epistemic duties concerning our beliefs. The core of the argument is that doxastic deontology requires voluntary control over our beliefs which we do not have. Alston relies on the ought implies can principle (OIC) to substantiate the idea that deontology requires voluntary control. The paper argues that Alston misconceives the OIC principle which constrains our duties in the epistemic cases, namely, the „can” of OIC should be explained in terms of individual cognitive capacities rather than voluntary control. This understanding of doxastic deontology saves our everyday doxastic deontological judgments but also renders doxastic deontology useless for epistemological purposes; in particular, it offers no hope for the deontological concept of justification. Why Is It Not Working? Viktor Gr no The presumed dichotomy between so-called propositions of fact and propositions of value is often criticized from different aspects. One of these critiques is based on the sup-