The Hungarian Quarterly, 1996 (41. évfolyam, 157. szám)
BOOKS AND AUTHORS - Garbiel Ronay: "We cannot do much more..." (Csaba Békés)
Eisenhower concurred. "If these states are assured any existence, they could elect their own governments, or whatever they would want, and we would be satisfied. This would offer a solution of the gravest dangers confronting world peace." Dulles's briefing of a presidential conference on the Hungarian situation the next day (October 27) fleshed out the American approach. It revealed that the US wanted no direct role; it preferred to act, not as the sole Western superpower, but as a member of the Western Alliance relying on the UN talking shop. "As far as the United Nations action is concerned, it is beginning to take shape," Dulles told the President and his advisers. "Together with the British, the French, the Canadians and the Australians, we are backing the move that the issue be put on the Security Council's agenda today." But Dulles also reported that, regardless of these Western moves, "the Hungarian uprising is becoming ever more general across the whole territory of the country. Significant units of the Hungarian armed forces have gone over to the insurgents and in the provinces significant territories have risen against the regime... Our Government has got in touch with the American Red Cross which, in turn, contacted the International ICRC, and is working on aid and medical supplies. "Refugees are crossing over in great numbers to Austria. They are looked after there and the Red Cross are also sending medical supplies to Austria and to Hungary. In my opinion, we cannot do much more and, for the time being, we should not either." Clearly, Washington was not prepared to jeopardize its twin-track policy objective vis-á-vis Moscow, but equally, it was not prepared to admit to the world that it was standing idly by as the anti-Communist uprising of a small East-Central European nation was being drowned in blood by the Soviet Army. The rhetoric directed against Soviet intervention was fulsome but not followed by action. The behind-the-scenes negotiations involving America, Britain and France at the United Nations appeared the best solution to avoid having the buck stop ■ in Washington—to paraphrase Truman's famous phrase. Eisenhower also realized that, in this moment of acute East-West crisis, India and the other non-aligned nations must be won over to the Western position. In an early morning telephone conversation (October 29, 08.00 hours) with his Secretary of State, the President suggested: "It would be useful to get Nehru involved in this. I suppose, it must have occurred to Nehru that he ought to establish closer links with the West provided we can find a face-saving formula that would allow him to do so." Dulles concurred replying that he had been thinking along similar lines. But the Suez crisis put a new spin on the Hungarian events and Britain and France smartly shifted ground. London and Paris wanted the UN General Assembly, hastily summoned to discuss the Middle East crisis, to discuss the Hungarian question too, whereas Washington wanted the latter to go before the more manageable Security Council. With the Great Powers at odds, the United Nations was unable to agree on any steps, let alone stop the second Soviet militaty onslaught on Hungary on November 4, 1956. The Kremlin must have been pleased. What this Realpolitik meant in practice can be gauged from the British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd's position paper for Anthony Eden, his Prime Minister, in connection with a mooted letter to Nikolai Bulganin, the Soviet Premier. "...Personally, 1 do not think that this would be an opportune moment for the sending of a M S Books & Authors