Acta Oeconomica 23. (1979)
1979 / 1-2. szám - Csaba László: Some Problems of the International Socialist Monetary System
L. CSABA: INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST MONETARY SYSTEM 31 signals of this thermometer that the Soviet Union is not interested in investing capital in this activity, but in drawing away capital from here and in investing it elsewhere, and that the net raw material importers should ensure the interestedness of the exporter, [34] since otherwise trade can be realized only through sacrifices made for political reasons. Some conclusions 1. It is true that the Soviet Union is the biggest raw material producer of the world, but it is true as well that in the Soviet Union the specific use of materials (per unit of output) is considerably higher than in developed capitalist countries, what is more, it exceeds also the corresponding data of some CMEA-countries (GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) as well. Therefore and also because of certain planning and interestedness conditions, analyzed otherwise also by the Soviet press [35], the problem of raw materials is a source of tension also for the Soviet internal economy, i.e. it is a bottle-neck. It is so in the market sense because of the decreasing returns on capital and the increasing materials intensity of the gross social output, and it is true in regional sense as well since the centre of raw material production has been transferred to Western Siberia already in this Five-Year Plan, while manufacturing is concentrated in the European part. [47] 2. Because of the above we can agree with the evaluation according to which it would be a mistake to say that the industrialization of Siberia is a “hunchback for the Soviet economy”, but one should rather speak about the development of an export branch of the Soviet Union which is most successful in Western relations. 80 per cent of the USSR’s exports to the West consist of raw materials (the share of crude oil amounts to 45 per cent alone) and this is the main source of compensation for the decisively non-competitive imports (grain and technology) and a guaranty for her creditworthiness (beside gold production). [36] 3. Therefore, contrary to the views analyzed in the foregoing, the Soviet Union is stimulated — even independently of the effect of internal and CMEA commodity and monetary relations having only a subordinate role — also by its own best, real economic interests to develop the extractive industry, though the prices with which the disputed computations on investment efficiency were made make this appear as the most irrational investment possible. Now it is possible to proceed in two directions to illustrate that in the CMEA-trade mutual advantages were enforced also in previous periods corresponding to the basic principles of socialist international division of labour, despite the fact that products with deviating fixed capital intensity were exchanged. Supposing hypothetic, ideal prices and considering them to be identical with marginal costs for the sake of being able to write this in mathematical form, it can be demonstrated through the examination of linear combinations in what price interval and under what constraints the exchange of products with deviating capital intensity will ensure mutual advantages. [11] Acta Oeconomica 23, 1979