ACTA JURIDICA - A MTA Jogtudományi Közleményei Tom. 5 (1963)

1963 / 1-2. sz. - KULCSÁR K.: The Historical Concept in the Science of Law of the XXth Century

2 К. Kulcsár was borne out by the right-wing demand for action which ultimately materia­lized as a concrete reality in the practice of fascism. Contemporary criticism aimed at historicism, however, has been by now directed against historically determined activity, it is based on the knowledge of the laws of history, it is directed against the kind of "must", which reflects evolving reality. This results particularly clearly from the analysis of Karl R. Popper according to whom historicism is characterized by the belief in the laws of historical deter­minism and this, respectively the scientifically conducted moulding of the society relying on their knowledge served only the tyrants and the Utopists.2 But we could also mention Ludwig von Mises, who maintains that the politi­cal content of historicism, which at the beginning expressed conservative thought, has already changed in the twentieth century and has become radical.3 All that goes to show unequivocally that the modern critics of historicism assess it by generalizing it on the ground of a certain form of its manifestation, namely on the ground of that form which recognizes that the laws prevailing in history are a reality and their cognizance and application are also within our power. We cannot now discuss the social grounds underlying this thought but the explicit views of the two authors quoted above show that such a hostil ity against history is connected with a certain general claim to get rid of the facts and laws of history and envisages to be operative against progressive actions in society based on the knowledge of the laws of history. Historicism, however, does not mean at all in all forms of its manifes­tation such a standpoint which would recognize the determination of the histo­rical process by laws. Consequently, the critique of historicism departing from such a starting point puts on the same level the various forms of its manifes­tation, despite their differring substance. The conception emphasizing histori­cal individuality, for instance, which may be traced back to Ranke and which characterized, with some alterations, even the philosophy of history of Dilthey, eliminated from the history not only the concept of progress ("All ages are alike near to God") but also the determination by laws of the historical pro­cess. It is very important to stress this point when the historical concept is discussed in relation to the science of law. In effect, the historicism of Ranke is not identical with that of Savigny (although the historical individuality of the epoch plays a certain role in the doctrine of Savigny, too) and the historicism of the jurisprudence of today is more closely connected with the Ranke—Dilthey­line than with the line of Savigny, respectively the historical conception of Savigny forms a part, with a specific interpretation of today, of the historical views in the XXth century. - K. R. POPPER, The Poverty of Historicism, Boston. 1957, pp. VII., IX —X. 3 L. v. MISES, Theory and. History, New Haven, 1957, p. 198.

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