ACTA HISTORICA - A MTA TÖRTÉNETTUDOMÁNYI FOLYÓIRATA TOM. 21 (1975)
21. kötet / 1-2. sz. - ETUDES - I. GONDA: The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Unrestricted Submarine Warfare
The Unrestricted Submarine Warfare 91 Hungary and to accept his credentials, all the less as the state that delegated him had completely identified itself with Germany in the question of the submarine warfare. The situation of Ambassador Tarnowsky therefore became almost intolerable, and on account of this there was nothing else left but to reduce the Austro-Hungarian representations to the status of chargé d'affaires, since starting the war against Germany - which the United States wanted to prosecute with full intensity - became inevitable for the United States.106 To maintain the status of embassy in this siiuation would have been possible (according to Tarnowsky) only at the price of great concessions.107 This opinion may be regarded as a vain hope cherished by his exaggerated optimism, which must have been rooted also in his erroneous judgement passed on the policy of the Allies. This policy did not even enable Austria-Hungary to make concessions. However, the repeated warnings of Tarnowsky that "the largest and most developed country with her democratic strength of recruiting will throw the immense reserves of her economy and energy into the balance after three years of warfare in order to prevent - at any cost - the victory of Germany", are to be judged more realistically.108 On 6 April 1917, Czernin none the less instructed Tarnowsky to leave Washington together with his personnel if the American Congress were to accept Wilson's address,109 and if the state of war between Germany and the United States came about. This situation really ensued on the same day: President Wilson declared in his address to the Congress that armed neutrality was no more an effective weapon against the U-boats, therefore he proposed the Congress to declare war on Germany. At the same time, he asserted that the war was to be prosecuted with all the strength and resources of the country and in co-ordination with the Allies - not against the German people, but against the Prussian government. In his address, the President did not mention the governments which were in alliance with Germany, and postponed to a later date the debate on the U.S.A. - Austria-Hungary relationship, and on the complete impossibility of the recognition of Tarnowsky as Ambassador under the given circumstances.110 It is known that the Senate accepted the address of the President, and the motion was passed with a majority of 82 votes for and 6 against in the Senate, while in the House with 373 for and 58 against. The state of war between Germany and the United States thus having come about, Austria-Hungary was forced to break without delay her relations with the United States.111 It is characteristic, however, that Tarnowsky, immediately before he received the order to this effect, had sent a report to his superior in which he wrote that the war could be avoided in his opinion, but the conviction that it was Germany who wanted war 106 ibid., Tel. von Gr. Tarnowsky, Washington, 1 April 1917, no. 37. 107 ibid., Tel. von Gr. Hadik, Stockholm, 4 April 1917, no. 105, Tel. aus Washington. 108 ibid., Tel. von Gr. Hadik, Stockholm, 4 April 1917, no. 106, Tel. von Washington, zu Tel. no. 39. 109 ibid., Tel. bleibt in Ziffern. Nach Stockholm vom 6.4.1917, no. 119, an Tarnowsky in Washington. 110 ibid., Tel. von B. Zwiedlinek, Washington (Date missing), 1917, no. 39. 111 ibid., 8 April 1917, Noten an den 1. k.k. Min.-Präsidenten, 2. k.u.k. Min.-Präsidenten etz. Acta Historica Academiae Sclentiarum Hungaricae 21, 197}